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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case raises a dormant commerce clause challenge to 
one aspect of the New Jersey Uniform Securities Law. The 
appellee, A.S. Goldmen & Co., Inc. ("Goldmen"), claims that 
N.J.S.A. S 49:3-60 ("S 60") violates the dormant commerce 
clause insofar as it authorizes the appellant New Jersey 
Bureau of Securities to prevent Goldmen from selling 
securities from New Jersey to buyers in other states where 
purchase of the securities was authorized by state 
 
regulators. The district court agreed, and granted summary 
judgment in favor of Goldmen. We hold that S 60 does not 
run afoul of the dormant commerce clause, and therefore 
reverse. 
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I. 
 
A. 
 
Because of the noted potential for fraud and deception in 
the buying and selling of securities, securities markets are 
among the most heavily regulated markets in the United 
States.2 Regulation of securities first flourished at the state 
level in the 1910s, when states began enacting laws that 
required the registration of a securities offering before the 
sale of the security was permitted. The purpose of these so- 
called "blue sky" laws was to allow state authorities to 
prevent unknowing buyers from being defrauded into 
buying securities that appeared valuable but in fact were 
worthless.3 By 1933, all but one state had passed blue sky 
laws; today, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Guam, 
and Puerto Rico have blue sky laws in force. See Louis Loss 
& Joel Seligman, 1 Securities Regulation 40-41 (3d ed. Rev. 
1998) (hereinafter, "Loss & Seligman").  
 
Aggressive federal regulation of securities markets began 
in the early 1930s with the passage of the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Today, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") administers 
these and five other federal statutes, which altogether form 
a complex web of federal regulations. See id. at 224-81. 
Despite this complex federal scheme, Congress, the courts, 
and the SEC have made explicit that federal regulation was 
not designed to displace state blue sky laws that regulate 
interstate securities transactions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 
S 77r(c) (1997) (preserving state jurisdiction "to investigate 
and bring enforcement actions with respect to . . . unlawful 
conduct by a broker or dealer") (National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 137 (1973) ("Congress 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Securities are the collective term used to describe documents that 
represent ownership in a company or a debt. Common examples include 
stocks, bonds, notes, convertible debentures, and warrants. See Black's 
Law Dictionary 1215 (5th ed. 1979); Joseph C. Long, 12 Blue Sky Law 
S 2.01 (1997). 
 
3. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the 
Blue Sky Laws, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 347 (1991). 
 
                                4 
  
intended to subject [securities] exchanges to state 
regulation that is not inconsistent with the federal [laws]."); 
Loss & Seligman at 275-281. Although the enactment of 
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
narrowed the role of state blue sky laws by expanding the 
range of federal preemption, federal and state regulations 
each continue to play a vital role in eliminating securities 
fraud and abuse. See Loss & Seligman at 60-62; Manning 
G. Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities 
Regulation: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. Rev. 495, 
497, 501-27 (1984) (describing how Congress, the courts, 
and the SEC have expressly authorized the enforcement of 
state blue sky laws). 
 
B. 
 
Among blue sky laws, the most common regulatory 
approach is the mixed disclosure and merit regulation 
scheme offered by the Uniform Securities Act ("Uniform Act").4 
Drafted in large part by the late Professor Louis Loss, the 
Uniform Act has been adopted with some modification in 
nearly forty states, including New Jersey. See N.J.S.A. 
S 49:3-47 to 76. The Act contains three essential parts: 
provisions requiring the registrations of securities sold 
within the state; provisions requiring the registration of 
persons involved in the securities industry; and various 
antifraud provisions. See id; see also Joseph C. Long, 12 
Blue Sky Law S 1.07 (1997) (hereinafter, "Long"). 
 
This case raises a constitutional challenge to N.J.S.A. 
S 49:3-60 ("S 60"), which is New Jersey's codification of the 
portion of the Uniform Act that makes it "unlawful for any 
security to be offered or sold in this State" unless the 
security is either registered by state authorities, is exempt 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The various state and federal securities regulations reflect two broad 
regulatory philosophies: merit regulation and disclosure. Regulations 
based on disclosure principles, such as the federal Securities Act of 
1933, seek to provide investors with all material and relevant 
information about the securities and the company offering them. In 
contrast, merit regulations seek to protect investors by prohibiting 
transactions that authorities deem unfair or unjust. See Joseph C. Long, 
12 Blue Sky Law S 1.05 (1997). 
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under N.J.S.A. S 49:3-50, or is a federally covered security.5 
When read in conjunction with N.J.S.A. S 49:3-51(c), which 
states that "an offer to sell or buy is made in this State . . . 
when the offer . . . originates in this State," S 60 grants New 
Jersey regulatory authorities the power to regulate the offer 
or sale of all non-exempt, non-covered securities whenever 
the offer is made within the state of New Jersey. Under 
N.J.S.A. S 49:3-64 and the 1985 amendments to the New 
Jersey statute, this authority permits the chief of the New 
Jersey Bureau of Securities ("Bureau") to exercise broad 
powers to regulate sale of such securities in New Jersey 
when it is deemed in the public interest and various 
statutory requirements have been met. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
A.S. Goldmen & Co. is a securities broker-dealer with its 
sole office located in Iselin, New Jersey.6 At the time of 
proceedings before the District Court, Goldmen's sole office 
was located in New Jersey. Since that time, it has opened 
at least one other office out of state. 
 
Goldmen specializes in underwriting the public offerings 
of low priced, over-the-counter securities, and then selling 
those securities in the secondary market. During thefirst 
several months of 1996, Goldmen planned the initial public 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In its current form, N.J.S.A. S 49:3-60 (1997) states: 
 
       It is unlawful for any security to be offered or sold in this State 
       unless: 
       (a) The security or transaction is exempt under section 3 of 
       P.L.1967, c. 93 (C.49:3-50); 
       . . . 
       (e) The security is registered under this act; or 
       (f) It is a federal covered security for which a notice filing and 
fees 
       have been submitted as required by section 14 of this act (C.49:3- 
       60.1). 
 
6. A "broker-dealer" is defined by the Act as "any person engaged in the 
business of effecting or attempting to effect transactions in securities 
for 
the accounts of others or for his own account." N.J.S.A. S 49:3-49(c). 
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offering of Imatec, Ltd. ("Imatec"). Imatec is a Delaware 
corporation, located in New York, that was formed in 1988 
to develop, design, market, and license image enhancement 
technologies. Goldmen planned for the Imatec securities to 
be traded as a NASDAQ Small Cap stock because such 
stocks are exempt from initial federal registration 
requirements, see 15 U.S.C. S 77(d) (1997). The primary 
regulation of the Imatec security during the first 25 
calendar days of the offering would occur at the state level. 
See 17 C.F.R. S 230.174(d) (1992). Accordingly, in May 
1996, Goldmen concurrently filed registration statements 
with the SEC, and also attempted to register the offering 
"by qualification" with state regulatory authorities in over a 
dozen states, including New Jersey.7 
 
The prospectus filed by Goldmen with the New Jersey 
Bureau of Securities ("the Bureau") listed Goldmen as the 
sole underwriter, and also indicated that Goldmen would 
own the shares to be offered to the public. Reviewing 
Goldmen's application, the Bureau expressed various 
concerns regarding the Imatec offering to Goldmen's 
counsel. Although the Bureau was not prepared to make 
allegations of fraud, it had already been investigating 
Goldmen's business practices at that time, and was 
concerned that the combination of Goldmen's practices and 
the bleak financial prospects of Imatec made the offering a 
high-risk investment that was likely to be associated with 
abusive and manipulative sales practices. 
 
On August 7, 1996, the Bureau informed Goldmen's 
counsel that it was considering the issuance of a stop order 
that would block the Imatec offering from being registered 
in New Jersey. Goldmen's counsel and the Bureau then 
entered into negotiations concerning the future of the 
Imatec offering. On October 23, 1996, these negotiations 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Registration "by qualification" is the most comprehensive form of blue 
sky registration, and is generally necessary when the security is exempt 
from initial federal registration requirements. The other types of 
registration, registration "by notification" and registration "by 
coordination," are much simpler and are reserved for securities that 
carry a higher indicia of reliability than securities that must be 
registered by qualification. See N.J.S.A.S 49:3-61 (describing 
requirements for registration by qualification). 
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resulted in a Consent Order signed by the CEO of Imatec 
and the Bureau chief. According to the Consent Order, 
Goldmen withdrew its application to register the Imatec 
offering in New Jersey, and agreed that the Imatec offering 
did not qualify for N.J.S.A. S 49:3-50(b) exemptions to the 
registration rule of S 60. Goldmen was permitted to make 
unsolicited sales from New Jersey or to sell to certain 
financial institutions or to other broker-dealers. However, 
the Consent Order specifically denied Goldmen exemptions 
that would have allowed it to solicit members of the public 
to purchase Imatec stock in the secondary market. App. 
38-41; App. 156-57. 
 
Five days after Goldmen entered into the Consent Order, 
on October 28, 1996, the registration statement that 
Goldmen had filed with the SEC became effective. 8 As of 
that date, Goldmen had managed to register the Imatec 
offering in sixteen states, but had been forced to withdraw 
its registration in several others, including New Jersey. 
 
On the morning of October 29, 1996, Goldmen 
commenced the initial public offering from its office in 
Iselin, New Jersey. By telephone, Goldmen solicited sales to 
individuals outside of New Jersey, but did not solicit any 
sales to individuals within New Jersey. By 3 p.m. of that 
day, Goldmen had sold the entire public offering. 9 
Subsequently, Goldmen continued to buy and sell Imatec 
securities in the interdealer market from its New Jersey 
office. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Registration with the SEC does not imply SEC approval of the offering. 
See 15 U.S.C. S 77w (1997) ("[T]he fact that the registration statement 
for 
a security has been filed or is in effect . . . shall [not] be deemed a 
finding by the Commission that the registration statement is true and 
accurate on its face . . . , or be held to mean that the Commission has 
in any way passed upon the merits of, or given approval to, such 
security.") 
 
9. We do not regard this case as moot despite the fact that the Imatec 
offerings are concluded. We are concerned that this kind of case 
presents a problem that may be capable of repetition but avoiding review 
with respect to Goldmen. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975). 
Due to the nature of Goldmen's business, this same problem may be 
confronted in the future. 
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The Bureau learned of Goldmen's sales on November 7, 
1996. Because the window for state regulation of the 
Imatec offering closed 25 days after the offering began,10 the 
Bureau acted immediately, notifying Goldmen that it 
believed that the sales violated the Securities Act and the 
Consent Order. Goldmen took the position that its sales 
violated neither state law nor the consent order, and 
informed the Bureau that it intended to continue to buy 
and sell securities from its New Jersey office. The Bureau 
responded by issuing a Cease and Desist Order dated 
November 12, 1996, which ordered Goldmen to "cease and 
desist from the solicitation of customers, offer and sale of 
Imatec in or from the State of New Jersey to any members 
of the public." App. 91. 
 
B. 
 
On the same day that the Bureau issued the Cease and 
Desist Order, Goldmen filed this declaratory judgment 
action against the Bureau in federal district court. 
Goldmen's complaint claimed that "the New Jersey 
Securities Act, as applied to securities that were not 
registered or exempt from registration in New Jersey and 
were sold by brokers located in New Jersey to residents of 
states (other than New Jersey) in which the securities were 
qualified for sale, violates the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution." The complaint also alleged that 
even if the Securities Act was constitutional, the Act and 
the Consent Order did not apply to block Goldmen's sales 
of Imatec securities from New Jersey. According to 
Goldmen, the sole legal effect of the Act and the Consent 
Order was to prohibit Goldmen from selling the securities 
to buyers located in New Jersey. 
 
The district court issued an Order to Show Cause, and 
held a hearing on November 20, 1996.11  The district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Under 15 U.S.C. S 77r(b)(4)(A) and 17 C.F.R. S 230.174(d), the Imatec 
security became a "covered security" 25 days after the initial public 
offering. At that time, state regulation was preempted. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 77r(a)(1)(A) (1997). 
 
11. At the hearing, the Bureau argued that Goldmen's federal action 
should be stayed under the abstention principles enunciated in Younger 
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issued a preliminary injunction the same day, enjoining the 
Bureau from taking any action that would prohibit 
Goldmen from "soliciting, offering or selling securities that 
are not registered or exempt from registration in New Jersey 
to residents of states (other than New Jersey) in which the 
securities are qualified for sale." App. 402-03. 
 
The case then proceeded to cross-motions for summary 
judgment. On August 21, 1997, the district court granted 
Goldmen's motion for summary judgment and denied the 
Bureau's summary judgment motion. The sole issue 
addressed was whether the New Jersey Uniform Securities 
Law violated the dormant commerce clause by authorizing 
the Bureau to block the sale of securities from New Jersey 
to buyers in other states where the security was registered. 
The district court concluded that it did. According to the 
district court, the law directly regulated interstate 
commerce because it effectively allowed the Bureau"to 
impose New Jersey securities regulations onto other states." 
The district court argued that "[t]o allow the Bureau to 
preclude consumers in other states from receiving 
solicitations to purchase securities which their own state 
regulators have deemed appropriate for purchase is, in 
essence, to allow the Bureau to substitute its own 
regulatory judgment for that of other states." Further, the 
district court argued that absent allegations of fraud, the 
Bureau had no interest in regulating such transaction. 
Accordingly, the New Jersey Uniform Securities Law 
imposed an excessive burden on interstate commerce in 
relation to New Jersey's local benefits. App. 581 (citing Pike 
v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970)). 
 
The Bureau filed a timely appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971). The district court rejected 
this argument. App. 446. Because the Bureau has chosen not to raise 
this issue on appeal, we will not address it further. Compare Ohio Bureau 
of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477-80, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 
1904 (1977). 
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III. 
 
A. Legal Framework 
 
The Supreme Court has long construed the Commerce 
Clause as implying a judicial power to invalidate state laws 
that interfere improperly with interstate commerce. See, 
e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 
(1851). One consistent strain of these cases authorizes 
courts to invalidate state regulations when their 
extraterritorial impact is so great that their "practical effect 
. . . is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the 
state." Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 336, 109 
S.Ct. 2491, 2499 (1989). As Justice Cardozo explained in 
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523, 55 S.Ct. 497, 
500 (1935), such a power is necessary to prevent states 
from applying "parochial" laws that can bring about "a 
speedy end of our national solidarity." "The Constitution," 
Justice Cardozo stated, "was framed upon the theory that 
the peoples of the several states must sink or swim 
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation 
are in union and not division." Id. 
 
According to these "extraterritorial effects" cases, a state 
may not attempt to regulate commerce that takes place 
"wholly outside" of its borders: such a "projection of one 
state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another 
State" is impermissible. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37; 109 
S. Ct. at 2499. Under this rubric, the Supreme Court has 
invalidated state laws that restricted interstate movement of 
goods based on the price paid for them in out-of-state 
transactions. See, e.g., Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521, 55 S. Ct. 
at 499 (invalidating New York law that banned the 
importation of milk into New York when the price paid 
outside of New York to the out-of-state producer was lower 
than that permitted under then-existing laws regulating 
milk purchases from New York producers); Lemke v. 
Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 61, 42 S. Ct. 244, 248 
(1922) (invalidating North Dakota law requiring exported 
wheat to be sold outside of North Dakota at price set by 
North Dakota state inspector). Similarly, the Court has 
struck down state laws that prohibited the importation of 
out-of-state goods unless the importer guaranteed that its 
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in-state prices were no higher than elsewhere. See, e.g., 
Healy, 491 U.S. at 337, 109 S. Ct. at 2499 (invalidating 
Connecticut law prohibiting beer imports unless seller 
guaranteed that prices offered in Connecticut were no 
higher than in neighboring states); Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 
106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986) (invalidating New York law 
requiring liquor importers to affirm that prices offered to 
New York wholesalers were lowest nationwide). Finally, the 
Court has invalidated laws granting officials in one state 
the authority to block multistate transactions that only 
marginally involve in-state interests. See Edgar v. MITE 
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46, 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2641-42 
(1982) (invalidating Illinois law that authorized Illinois 
officials to block substantively unfair takeovers of 
multistate companies that had connections to Illinois and 
also other states). 
 
Of course, these cases do not establish that the states 
are forbidden categorically to regulate transactions that 
involve interstate commerce. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du 
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-33, 69 S. Ct. 657, 662 (1949) 
(Jackson, J.) (recognizing that States have "broad power . . . 
to protect its inhabitants against . . . fraudulent traders . . . 
even by use of measures which bear adversely upon 
interstate commerce"). Rather, states are permitted to 
regulate in-state components of interstate transactions so 
long as the regulation furthers legitimate in-state interests. 
A particularly relevant example of this is Hall v. Geiger- 
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217 (1917), and its 
companion cases, Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 
242 U.S. 559, 37 S.Ct. 224 (1917) and Merrick v. N.W. 
Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 37 S.Ct. 227 (1917) 
(collectively, the "Blue Sky Cases"). In the Blue Sky Cases, 
the Court considered dormant commerce clause challenges 
to then-recently enacted Blue Sky laws in Ohio, South 
Dakota, and Michigan. Although the three statutes differed 
somewhat, each granted state securities commissions the 
authority to block the in-state sale or purchase of 
unlicensed securities. The laws were challenged both by 
unlicensed in-state securities sellers and the out-of-state 
purchasers who had traveled in-state to make their 
purchases, but the Court rejected their claims that the laws 
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violated the dormant commerce clause. The key to the laws' 
constitutionality, the Court held, was that "[t]he provisions 
of the law . . . apply to dispositions of securities within the 
state." Hall, 242 U.S. at 557, 37 S. Ct. at 223 (emphasis in 
original). By limiting the scope of the statute to dispositions 
of securities "within the State," the Court announced, the 
states had merely enacted "police regulation[s]," that 
"affect[ed] interstate commerce . . . only incidentally." Id. at 
558, 37 S. Ct. at 223; see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 93, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1651-52 (1987) 
(rejecting challenge by out-of-state company to Indiana law 
conditioning acquisition of corporate control of Indiana 
corporation on approval of a majority of the pre-existing 
disinterested shareholders, reasoning that law regulated in- 
state corporations); cf. Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co, 268 
U.S. 189, 200, 45 S. Ct. 481, 485 (1925) (invalidating North 
Dakota law that regulated in-state handling of wheat 
headed for interstate commerce that served no legitimate 
in-state interests). 
 
B. Territoriality 
 
As these cases indicate, the constitutionality of state 
regulations of interstate commerce depends largely on the 
territorial scope of the transaction that the state law seeks 
to regulate. If the transaction to be regulated occurs "wholly 
outside" the boundaries of the state, the regulation is 
unconstitutional. MITE Corp, 457 U.S. at 642. If the 
transaction occurs "within" the boundaries of the state, it is 
constitutional so long as the regulation furthers legitimate 
in-state interests. See id. at 643-46; CTS Corp, 481 U.S. at 
93. 
 
Therefore, the first issue we must address is the 
territorial scope of the transaction that New Jersey has 
attempted to regulate. The question is, what is the 
territorial basis of a contract entered into by telephone 
between a New Jersey broker soliciting sales of Imatec 
securities from New Jersey, and an out-of-state buyer who 
agrees to purchase them outside of New Jersey? More 
particularly, can it fairly be said that such a transaction 
occurs "wholly outside" New Jersey? As this is a legal 
question, our review is plenary. See Ciarlante v. Brown & 
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Williamson Tobacco Corp., 143 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
Goldmen and the Bureau offer divergent views ofS 60's 
territorial scope. Goldmen argues that S 60 permits New 
Jersey to reach out beyond its borders and block willing 
buyers from completing transactions authorized by their 
home states. According to Goldmen, "the effects of the 
Bureau's application of Section 60 is not to regulate in- 
state brokers, but to preclude out-of-state residents from 
purchasing a product deemed appropriate for sale by their 
own regulators." Br. at 20. Goldmen suggests that the 
offer's origin in New Jersey is not relevant to the 
transaction's territoriality, because "the `practical effect' of 
permitting New Jersey to bar the sale of securities from 
New Jersey into states where those securities have been 
qualified for sale is that those out-of-state residents will be 
precluded altogether from receiving the opportunity to 
purchase these securities." Id. at 16. 
 
The Bureau's position is that S 60 regulates the offering 
of securities entirely within the state of New Jersey. 
According to the Bureau, 
 
       Section 60 simply regulates how brokers located in 
       New Jersey conduct business from their New Jersey 
       offices. In this instance, these were Imatec securities 
       . . . offered for sale by the underwriter through 
       solicitations of the public from New Jersey. The offer 
       and sale arose in New Jersey. Goldmen chose to 
       domicile its highly-regulated business in New Jersey 
       and to conduct that business from within the State. 
 
Br. at 27.12 The Bureau concedes that S 60 may affect 
interstate commerce, to the extent that sellers such as 
Goldmen try to sell securities to buyers in other states. 
However, the Bureau contends that this is merely an 
indirect effect of what is essentially New Jersey's regulation 
of New Jersey parties seeking to sell securities in New 
Jersey. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Both amici, North American Securities Aministrators Association and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, support the position taken by 
the New Jersey Bureau of Securities that S 60 does not violate the 
dormant commerce clause. 
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In resolving this question, we begin by noting that 
notions of the territorial scope of contracts between citizens 
of different states have evolved in the past century. At one 
time, it was fashionable to conceive of contracts between 
diverse parties as being rooted in a single geographical 
location, such as the place the offer was accepted. See, e.g., 
Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs Validity of a Contract, 
23 Harv. L. Rev. 260, 270-71 (1910). Under this traditional 
approach, it was believed that when a contract offer made 
in New Jersey was accepted in New York, the contract was 
"made" in New York, and thus implicated New York's 
sovereignty. See id; cf. Perrin v. Pearlstein, 314 F.2d 863, 
867 (2d Cir. 1963). 
 
The contrasting modern approach is to recognize that 
contracts formed between citizens in different states 
implicate the regulatory interests of both states. Thus, 
when an offer is made in one state and accepted in another, 
we now recognize that elements of the transaction have 
occurred in each state, and that both states have an 
interest in regulating the terms and performance of the 
contract. See, e.g., General Ceramics Inc. v. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 647, 656-59 (3d Cir. 1995) (comparing the 
regulatory interests of New Jersey and Pennsylvania to a 
contract formed between a New Jersey company and a 
Pennsylvania company in the course of determining 
applicable law). See generally Joseph W. Singer, A 
Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 731, 785-802 
(1990) (describing the regulatory interests of states in 
contract disputes between diverse parties). 
 
This notion that the sovereignty of both the state of the 
offeror and offeree are implicated by contracts entered into 
by citizens in different states is the key to understanding 
the territorial scope of the contract between Goldmen and 
the prospective buyers of Imatec in another state such as 
New York. A contract between Goldmen in New Jersey and 
a buyer in New York does not occur "wholly outside" New 
Jersey, just as it does not occur "wholly outside" New York. 
Rather, elements of the transaction occur in each state, 
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and each state has an interest in regulating the aspect of 
the transaction that occurs within its boundaries.13 
 
Accordingly, S 60 simply allows the Bureau to regulate its 
"half" of the transaction-- the offer that occurs entirely 
within the state of New Jersey-- and thus its territorial 
scope is indistiguishable from that in Hall v. Geiger-Jones 
Co., 242 U.S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217 (1917), Caldwell v. Sioux 
Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 37 S.Ct. 224 (1917) 
and Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 37 S.Ct. 
227 (1917). 
 
Viewed in this light, Goldmen's view that S 60 violates the 
dormant commerce clause because it projects its ban into 
jurisdictions that would allow the transaction is logically 
flawed and simply proves too much. If New Jersey seeks to 
block Goldmen's offering but the buyer's state (say, New 
York) would allow it, one state must prevail. One state can 
in effect "force its judgment" upon the other. Under New 
Jersey's Blue Sky law, New Jersey can block the 
transaction even if New York would permit it. 
 
Goldmen's alternative is no better, however: under its 
view of the dormant commerce clause, New York's approval 
would permit the transaction, over New Jersey's objection. 
Thus, the difference between New Jersey's Blue Sky law 
and Goldmen's proposal is simply the market's default rule: 
should the transaction be allowed if either state permits, or 
blocked if either side objects? Such questions of the 
market's "structure" and its "method of operation" are quite 
simply beyond the concern of the Commerce Clause, as 
they "relate to the wisdom of the statute, not to its burden 
on commerce." Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 
U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978). 
 
C. Legitimate Interests 
 
Having concluded that S 60 regulates the in-state 
component of an interstate transaction, we next consider 
whether the statute reasonably furthers a "legitimate 
interest" within the boundaries of New Jersey. MITE Corp., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. A discussion of New Jersey's interests in this transaction appears in 
subsection C. 
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457 U.S. at 644, 102 S. Ct. at 2641; CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 
93, 107 S. Ct. at 1651-52. 
 
Goldmen claims that New Jersey has no legitimate 
interest in regulating Goldmen's non-fraudulent sales to 
out-of-state residents. If Goldmen's business practices are 
manipulative, Goldmen argues, the harm will be suffered 
entirely by out-of-state consumers. Br. at 29. Because the 
protection of out-of-state consumers from potentially 
manipulative sales practices is not New Jersey's legitimate 
concern, Goldmen contends, its regulation of Goldmen's 
non-fraudulent sales to out-of-state consumers does not 
implicate any legitimate regulatory interests within the 
state of New Jersey. 
 
The Bureau responds by arguing that its regulation of in- 
state sales of securities to out-of-state purchasers furthers 
important New Jersey interests. We agree. In particular, we 
consider two legitimate state interests to be particularly 
strong ones. First, preventing New Jersey companies from 
offering suspect securities to out-of-state buyers helps 
preserve the reputation of New Jersey's legitimate securities 
issuers. States that have failed to monitor out-of-state sales 
by in-state broker-dealers have suffered in the past, as 
their legitimate broker-dealers suffered from association 
with suspect firms offering questionable securities. See 
Long, S 3.04[3][a] at 3-51 to 3-52 (providing examples); see 
also Stevens v. Wrigley Pharma. Co., 154 A. 403, 403 (N.J. 
Ch. Div. 1931) (noting that New Jersey's interest in 
regulating in-state offers to out-of-state buyers is"not so 
much to protect the citizens of other states, as to prevent 
this state from being used as a base of operations for 
crooks marauding outside the state."); Simms Inv. Co. v. 
E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. Supp. 543, 545 (M.D.N.C. 1988) 
("[T]he laws protect legitimate resident issuers by exposing 
illegitimate resident issuers."). Although this state interest 
is heightened when the state can prove that the in-state 
firm has engaged in outright fraud, the interest is 
nonetheless legitimate when the state seeks to block sales 
of securities that it believes might be associated with 
dubious or manipulative sales practices. The difference 
between a state's (i.e., New Jersey's) interest in preventing 
fraud and preventing questionable practices is a difference 
in degree, not a difference in kind. 
 
                                17 
  
The dissent contends that absent proof of actual fraud, 
New Jersey has an insufficient interest in regulating 
securities dealers who sell to out-of-state buyers. It is 
undisputed that the purpose of securities registration laws 
is to prevent fraud before it happens, and S 60 serves such 
a prophylactic purpose. Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 
U.S. 568, 587 (1917);14 Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards 
Co., 242 U.S. 559, 564 (1917) (upholding Blue Sky Law 
designed "to prevent fraud in the sale and disposition of 
stocks, bonds or other securities sold or offered for sale 
within the state"); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 
551 (1917) (upholding Blue Sky Law designed to "prevent 
deception and save credulity and ignorance from 
imposition"); Cola v. Terzano, 322 A.2d 195, 198 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (providing that the New Jersey 
Uniform Securities Law is intended to protect the 
uninitiated and to prevent frauds upon the public at large), 
aff'd sub nom. Cola v. Packer, 383 A.2d 460 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1974); New Jersey v. Russell, 291 A.2d 583, 587 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (recognizing that the sale 
of securities is a specialized field of activity in which the 
potential for abuse and financial injury is great); Enntex Oil 
& Gas Co. (of Nevada) v. Texas, 560 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question, 439 U.S. 961 (1978). New 
Jersey's regulation of sales by in-state brokers to out-of- 
state buyers serves the legitimate purpose of preventing 
fraudulent transactions. 
 
Regulating in-state offers to out-of-state buyers also 
serves New Jersey interests by protecting New Jersey 
residents from dubious securities that enter the state in the 
secondary market. This risk is particularly great because a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14.    [W]e think the [securities registration] statute under review is 
within 
       the power of the state. It burdens honest business, it is true, but 
       burdens it only that under its forms dishonest business may not be 
       done. This manifestly cannot be accomplished by mere declaration; 
       there must be conditions imposed and provision made for their 
       performance. Expense may thereby be caused and inconvenience, 
       but to arrest the power of the state by such considerations would 
       make it impotent to discharge its function. 
 
Id. at 587 (emphasis added). 
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broker-dealer such as Goldmen could otherwise delay or 
even avoid the Bureau's scrutiny through an initial sale to 
a cooperative party outside New Jersey. Because there is no 
filing requirement for secondary transactions, Goldmen 
could arrange to "sell" a security to a friendly out-of-state 
party, immediately buy back the security, and then sell it 
freely to New Jersey residents using possibly questionable 
sales practices. App. 77-78.15 New Jersey's most effective 
means of preventing such an undesirable result would be to 
block the initial public offering. See Long, S 3.04[3][b-c] at 
3-52 to 3-53. 
 
In conclusion, the Bureau's application of S 60 to 
Goldmen's Imatec offering furthers two legitimate state 
interests: preserving the reputation of New Jersey broker- 
dealers, and protecting New Jersey buyers in the secondary 
market. 
 
IV. 
 
Because the Bureau's application of S 60 regulates the in- 
state portion of an interstate transaction and furthers 
legitimate in-state interests, the application ofS 60 to 
regulate the Imatec offering does not violate the dormant 
commerce clause. In so holding, we note that our 
conclusion is in accordance with the overwhelming majority 
of courts that have considered dormant commerce clause 
challenges to blue sky laws. See, e.g., Hall, 242 U.S. at 557; 
Enntex Oil & Gas Co. v. Texas, 560 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1977), appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial 
federal question, 439 U.S. 961 (1978); Chrysler Capital 
Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 800 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Upton v. Trinidad Petroleum Corp., 468 F. 
Supp. 330, 336 (N.D.Ala. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 652 
F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1981); Oil Resources v. Florida, 583 F. 
Supp. 1027 (S.D.Fla. 1984), aff'd without op., 746 F.2d 814 
(11th Cir. 1984); see also Loss & Seligman at 39-40 ("On 
the whole, it seems fair to say that there no longer need be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Notably, there is evidence in the record that Goldmen had engaged in 
such practices before. App. 196-98. 
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any substantial constitutional doubts about blue sky  
provisions.").16 
 
Indeed, the established heritage and near universality of 
the provision that Goldmen has challenged itself 
underscores its constitutionality. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 
336-37, 109 S. Ct. at 2499. Goldmen has challenged a state 
provision that is an established strand in the legal fabric of 
securities regulation. The power that Goldmen claims would 
unduly burden interstate commerce is one that most states 
have long exercised, and that Congress has for decades 
expressly allowed to continue. This is not the sort of 
"parochial" state power that Justice Cardozo warned of in 
Baldwin, the broad exercise of which "would .. . invite a 
speedy end of our national solidarity." Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 
523, 55 S.Ct. at 500. 
 
We will therefore reverse the order of the district court 
dated August 21, 1997, and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Goldmen relies heavily on Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Media Products, 
Inc., 158 Ariz. 463, 763 P.2d 527 (Ariz. App. 1988), the one case that 
runs counter to the many upholding state blue sky laws against dormant 
commerce clause challenges. Media Products is distinguishable, however, 
because in that case Arizona sought to bar an Arizona company from 
selling a security outside of Arizona through an agent outside of Arizona 
to a buyer who was also outside of Arizona. In other words, the only 
connection the transaction had with Arizona was that the principal place 
of business of the seller was located there. See id. at 464-65; 763 P.2d 
at 528-29. ("Sales of the entire issue were negotiated out-of-state[,] 
solely 
by [an] out-of-state underwriter . . . . No sales or offers of sale were 
made 
in Arizona."). Because the offer and acceptance took place entirely 
outside of Arizona, Arizona's attempt to block the transaction was not an 
effort to regulate the in-state component of an interstate transaction, as 
is the case here. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues. 
The majority recognizes New Jersey's right to regulate that 
portion of a multi-state transaction occurring within its 
borders because "one state must prevail" in a dispute that 
extends beyond its borders and involves residents of other 
states. Maj. Op. at 16. The approach the majority uses 
would be helpful to resolving a choice of law dispute, but it 
is of only limited assistance in adjudicating this dispute 
under the Commerce Clause. New Jersey does not allege 
that Goldmen's sale of Imatec stock involved fraud, and the 
district court concluded that fraud was not involved. See 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7 ("The Bureau does not advance a single 
allegation of fraud"). Thus, the issue is not which state will 
win, but whether New Jersey's interest here is sufficient to 
allow it to prevent Goldmen from soliciting residents of 
other states. The district court concluded, "the Bureau is 
reaching out to prohibit a sale, not made to New Jersey 
residents, which takes place in a national securities 
market, and which is regulated by each state to protect its 
own citizens." Id. The district court concluded that New 
Jersey's interest was not sufficient to allow that result. I 
agree, and would affirm the well reasoned decision of the 
district court. 
 
I. 
 
My colleagues cite General Ceramics Inc. v. Firemen's 
Fund Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 647, 656-59 (3rd Cir.) to justify the 
conclusion that New Jersey's interest in regulating offers 
made from within its borders justifies preventing Goldmen 
from offering shares of Imatec to buyers residing in states 
where that security is properly registered. Maj. Op. at 15. 
 
In Firemen's Fund, the issue was 
 
       whether New Jersey or Pennsylvania law controls the 
       interpretation of an exception to a pollution-exclusion 
       clause when New Jersey has significant contacts with 
       the insurance contract and the insured but 
       Pennsylvania is the site of the hazardous waste site 
       giving rise to the liability for which coverage is sought. 
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Id., at 649. The dispute arose in a diversity case where we 
applied New Jersey's choice of law rules to determine if the 
law of New Jersey or Pennsylvania governed the 
interpretation of an exception to a pollution-exclusion 
clause in a comprehensive liability insurance policy. The 
loss that gave rise to the dispute resulted from costs 
incurred under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Our 
analysis focused upon which state's law controlled"whether 
the phrase `sudden and accidental' extended coverage for 
the gradual discharge of pollution." Id., at 652. We held 
that New Jersey law applied. Id. ("Based on the strong 
public policy that underlies New Jersey's broad 
interpretation of the pollution-exclusion exception,. . . New 
Jersey law governs."). We reached that result because the 
interests of Pennsylvania would not have been furthered by 
applying its law to that particular dispute, whereas the 
interests of New Jersey were furthered by applying the law 
of New Jersey. Id., at 657. 
 
That does not assist us here. The controversy here is not 
merely between the conflicting regulations of two or more 
states. Rather, this dispute focuses upon the impact of that 
conflict upon interstate commerce. Nor, do I believe that the 
Blue Sky Cases1 support the majority's conclusion. 
Although those cases do address the scope of the 
restrictions imposed on states under the Commerce Clause, 
they do not address the precise issue that Goldmen raises. 
In Merrick, (one of the Blue Sky Cases) the Court did not 
even address whether the Blue Sky Law at issue violated 
the Commerce Clause. Instead, the Court reserved that 
question for decision in Geiger-Jones v. Hall - a companion 
case to Merrick. See Merrick, 242 U.S. at 590. In Hall, the 
Court reviewed an Ohio law that required sellers of 
securities to obtain a license before offering any securities 
for sale within the state. An Ohio securities broker with 
clients in several states including Ohio (Geiger-Jones) 
brought a multi-faceted challenge to the legality of Ohio's 
licensing requirement. The primary assertion was that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217 (1917), Caldwell 
v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 37 S.Ct. 224 (1917) and 
Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 37 S.Ct. 227 (1917). 
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Ohio's licensing requirement was an improper exercise of 
the state's police power. 242 U.S. at 548. The Court 
concluded that the requirement was a valid means of 
protecting against fraud, and noted that the 
Commissioner's ability to deny or revoke a license was 
qualified by a duty of good faith, and subject to judicial 
review. Id., at 553. The Court reasoned: 
 
       The provisions . . . apply to dispositions . . . within the 
       state, and while information of those issued in other 
       states . . . is required to be filed, they are only affected 
       by the requirement of a license of one who deals in 
       them within the state. Upon their transportation into 
       the state there is no impediment, -- no regulation of 
       them or interference with them after they get there. 
       There is the exaction only that he who disposes of 
       them there shall be licensed to do so, and this only 
       that they may not appear in false character . . . and 
       this certainly is only an indirect burden upon them as 
       objects of interstate commerce, if they may be regarded 
       as such. It is a police regulation strictly, not affecting 
       them until there is an attempt to make disposition of 
       them within the state. Such regulations affect interstate 
       commerce in them only incidentally. 
 
242 U.S. at 557-8 (emphasis added). Here, the regulation in 
question has a far greater impact upon commerce outside 
of the state. It prevents solicitation of residents of other 
states and thereby has the practical effect of halting sales 
to individual purchasers unless those purchasers know of 
the securities and make Goldmen an unsolicited offer to 
buy. In fact, the Bureau's entire justification for S 60 rests 
upon its admitted desire to stop such solicitations, and 
thereby stop solicited sales. Therefore, it is as misleading as 
it is inaccurate to conclude that the extraterritorial affect of 
S 60 is "incidental" and to uphold the prohibition as a 
regulation of New Jersey's "half" of an interstate 
transaction. See Maj. Op. at 16. Themajority states: 
 
       If New Jersey seeks to block Goldmen's offering but the 
       buyer's state (say, New York) would allow it, one state 
       must prevail. One state can in effect "force its 
       judgment" upon the other. . . . block the transaction 
       even if New York would permit it. 
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       Goldmen's alternative is no better, however: under its 
       view of the dormant commerce clause, New York's 
       approval would permit the transaction, over New 
       Jersey's objection. Thus, the difference between New 
       Jersey's Blue Sky law and Goldmen's proposal is simply 
       the market's default rule: should the transaction be 
       allowed if either state permits, or blocked if either side 
       objects? Such questions of the market's "structure" and 
       its "method of operation" are quite simply beyond the 
       concern of the Commerce Clause, as they "relate to the 
       wisdom of the statute, not to its burden on commerce." 
       Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 
       127-28 (1978). 
 
Maj. Op. at 16. However, applying S 60 to bar solicitation 
where a security could otherwise be sold goes to the very 
heart of the Commerce Clause. The question is not which 
state's regulations will prevail, but whether either state has 
an interest of sufficient gravity to allow it to enforce its 
regulations in a manner that so effects interstate 
commerce. The majority's analysis focuses only upon the 
interest of the inconsistent regulatory schemes in the 
relevant "competing" states. That approach fails to afford 
proper recognition of the overriding federal interest that 
must control under a Commerce Clause analysis. See 
Kassell et al. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. 450 U.S. 
662 (1981). 
 
In Kassell, an interstate trucking company sought to 
strike down an Iowa law that limited the size of trucks on 
interstate highways in Iowa to 50 feet. Consolidated 
Freightways sought to invalidate the restriction arguing it 
burdened interstate commerce. Neighboring states, and 
nearly all other states in the west, and midwest allowed 
trucks up to 65 feet in length on the portion of interstate 
highways within their borders. Accordingly, interstate 
trucking companies had to either use shorter trucks to 
transport cargo through the midwest, route cargo around 
Iowa, or switch trailers at the Iowa border in order to insure 
that they did not exceed Iowa's length restriction. The Court 
concluded that Iowa's proffered justification of safety was 
tenuous at best because the record did not establish that 
reducing trailer size had as direct an impact on the safety 
of an interstate highway as Iowa claimed. 
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       Regulations designed for [safety] nevertheless may 
       further the purpose so marginally, and interfere with 
       commerce so substantially, as to be invalid under the 
       Commerce Clause. . . . In [Raymond Motor 
       Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, (1978)] we 
       declined to accept the State's contention that the 
       inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended without 
       a weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the 
       degree of interference with interstate commerce. 434 
       U.S., at 443, 98 S.Ct., at 795. This "weighing" by a 
       court requires-- and indeed the constitutionality of the 
       state regulation depends on-- a sensitive consideration 
       of the weight and nature of the state regulatory 
       concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on 
       the course of interstate commerce. 
 
Id. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Although it appears at first that Kassell can easily be 
distinguished from the facts before us, I believe the ease 
with which Kassell can be dismissed is somewhat illusory. 
The distinction stems from the tangible nature of the 
commerce involved in Kassell rather than the quality of its 
relationship to interstate commerce. The impact of a 
regulation upon trucks moving on interstate highways is 
readily apparent. The impact of S 60 upon commerce 
outside of New Jersey is intangible, but nevertheless real. 
New Jersey's interest here is not prevention of fraud 
because fraud is not alleged. Thus, I disagree with the 
weight the majority attaches to New Jersey's claimed 
interest in protecting the reputation of securities dealers 
that sell from offices in New Jersey. Maj. Op. at 17. New 
Jersey's attempt to preserve S 60 by pointing to its 
legitimate interest in preventing fraud is not unlike Iowa's 
attempt to preserve its regulation by arguing that it 
furthered the safety of its interstate highways in Kassell. 
That argument was not supported by the record there, and 
the fraud argument is not supported by the record here. 
New Jersey can not prevent the sale of a security in a state 
where the sale is proper merely by alleging a concern for 
the speculative nature of Imatec, and alleging concerns 
regarding Goldmen's business practices. If Goldmen (or any 
other broker) engages in misleading and improper business 
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practices in the sale of Imatec stock (or any other stock or 
commodity for that matter) New Jersey can certainly 
investigate and remedy the situation under its police 
powers. See Merrick, supra. The Bureau can prohibit fraud 
in the offer, sale and purchase of securities, N.J.S.A. 49:3- 
52; it can prohibit misleading filings, N.J.S.A. 49:3-54; it 
can prohibit unlawful representations concerning 
registration, N.J.S.A. 49:3-55; it can conduct investigations, 
subpoena witnesses and require the production of evidence, 
N.J.S.A. 49:3-68; and it can enjoin illegal conduct, N.J.S.A. 
49:3-69. 
 
Accordingly, the majority's citation to Stevens v. Wrigley 
Pharma. Co., 154 A. 403, 403 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1931) (noting 
that New Jersey's interest in regulating in-state offers to 
out-of-state buyers is "not so much to protect the citizens 
of other states, as to prevent this state from being used as 
a base of operations for crooks marauding outside the 
state."), and Simms Inv. Co. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 699 F. 
Supp. 543, 545 (M.D.N.C. 1988) ("[T]he laws protect 
legitimate resident issuers by exposing illegitimate resident 
issuers."), is misplaced. See Maj. Op. at 17. If that is New 
Jersey's interest here, let the Bureau allege and prove 
fraud. We are far too quick to allow New Jersey to proceed 
as though it had established a fraud it is not even alleging. 
We ought not rest our decision here upon concerns that 
arise from insinuations and implications about unproven, 
and unalleged, conduct on the part of Goldmen. 
 
The majority also relies upon New Jersey's ability to 
regulate "in-state offers to out-of-state buyers" stating that 
such an interest "also serves New Jersey interests by 
protecting New Jersey residents from dubious securities 
that enter the state in the secondary market." Maj. Op. at 
18. Yet, S 60 does not do that. Goldmen can solicit sales of 
Imatec shares to institutional buyers, and other broker- 
dealers no matter where they are located. Similarly, he can 
sell these shares to individuals in New Jersey and 
elsewhere so long as he does not solicit the buyer. Once 
any such sales occur, the shares are in the secondary 
market and Goldmen is no longer restrained by S 60.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Bureau takes the position that individuals who make an 
unsolicited offer to buy from Goldmen, and institutional buyers and 
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II. 
 
The Supreme Court "has adopted what amounts to a two- 
tiered approach to analyzing state economic regulation 
under the Commerce Clause." Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 
578-79 (1986). "When a state statute directly regulates or 
discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its 
effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of- 
state interests, [the Supreme Court] has generally struck 
down the statute without further inquiry." Id. at 579. 
"When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on 
interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, [the 
Court] has examined whether the State's interest is 
legitimate and whether the burden on interest commerce 
clearly exceeds the local benefits." Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
 
Although I believe a strong case can be made that S 60 
falls within the first tier of inquiry and therefore could be 
struck down as a per se violation of the Commerce Clause, 
I think our inquiry should, more appropriately, be 
conducted under the Pike balancing test that guides inquiry 
under the second tier.3 
 
Although the majority does not directly refer to Pike v. 
Bruce Church, it is obvious that, by discussing New Jersey's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
other broker-dealers are better informed. The Bureau reasons that 
extremely risky securities will, therefore, not enter New Jersey via the 
secondary market as they won't be sold in the first place. However, these 
better informed buyers may well purchase shares of even the riskiest 
stock based upon a belief that the risk is offset by the selling price, 
and 
the potential for greater profit. For a discussion of the various theories 
of how risk, information about an issuer, and potential profit are 
factored into the selling price of shares of stock, see Robert G. Newkirk, 
Comment, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the Market in the Initial Public 
Offering, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1393 (1991). 
 
3. The Supreme Court has "recognized that there is no clear line 
separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se 
invalid 
under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. 
Bruce Church balancing approach." Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New 
York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. at 578-79."In either situation the 
critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local 
and 
interstate activity." Id. 
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local interests, it is engaging in a balancing of interests as 
required by Pike. In Pike, the Court wrote: 
 
       Where the statute regulates even-handedly to 
       effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its 
       effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
       will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
       commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local 
       putative benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, 
       then the question becomes one of degree. And the 
       extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course 
       depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and 
       on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser 
       impact on interstate activities. Occasionally the Court 
       has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in 
       resolving these issues, but more frequently it has 
       spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect" effects and 
       burdens. 
 
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 
Moreover, a state cannot impose its regulatory scheme on 
another state in an effort to "control conduct beyond the 
boundaries of the state." Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 
324, 326 (1989). This prohibition against extraterritoriality 
"reflect[s] the Constitution's special concern both with the 
maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by 
state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with 
the autonomy of the individual states with their respective 
spheres." Id. The Supreme Court has summarized the 
application of the limitations inherent in the Commerce 
Clause as follows: 
 
       [O]ur cases concerning the extraterritorial effects of 
       state economic regulation stand at a minimum for the 
       following propositions: First, the Commerce Clause . . . 
       precludes the application of a state statute to 
       commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's 
       borders, whether or not the commerce has effects 
       within the State. . . . Second, a statute that directly 
       controls commerce occurring wholly outside the 
       boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the 
       enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of 
       whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was 
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       intended by the legislature. The critical inquiry is 
       whether the practical effect of the regulation is to 
       control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State. 
       Third, the practical effect of the statute must be 
       evaluated not only by considering the consequences of 
       the statute itself, but also by considering how the 
       challenged statute may interact with the legitimate 
       regulatory regimes of other States and what effect 
       would arise if not one, but many or every, State 
       adopted similar legislation. Generally speaking, the 
       Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent 
       legislation arising from the projection of one state 
       regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another. 
 
Id. at 336-37 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 
I agree that Goldmen's telephone solicitation of out-of- 
state buyers for shares of Imatec would not be a 
transaction occurring "wholly outside" of New Jersey. 
However, the majority's view that the Bureau is only 
regulating its "half" of a transaction by prohibiting Goldmen 
from soliciting out-of-state buyers, see Maj. Opn. at 16, is 
accurate in theory, but not accurate in the jurisprudential 
reality of the Commerce Clause. Goldmen is not the issuer 
of these securities. It is only the underwriter. Imatec, a 
Delaware corporation whose main office is in New York, is 
the issuer. Imatec's only connection with New Jersey is that 
its offering was underwritten by a broker-dealer who 
happens to be located there, and that broker dealer 
planned to solicit out-of-state sales from its New Jersey 
office. It may be reasonably assumed that out of state 
buyers would purchase these shares from funds held in 
financial institutions outside of New Jersey, and that any 
profits would be deposited into those same financial 
institutions. Moreover, the growth and fiscal strength of 
Imatec, the Delaware corporation, is related to the value of 
its shares. Thus, New Jersey's only connection with this 
interstate transaction lies in the fortuitous circumstance 
that a broker-dealer would be sitting at a desk somewhere 
in New Jersey making telephone calls to residents of the 16 
states where Imatec securities are appropriately registered 
and authorized for purchase. 
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Goldmen has satisfied the registration requirements of 16 
states and those states allow their residents to be solicited 
to purchase shares of Imatec. Each of those states could 
have enacted a regulatory scheme that only allowed the 
sale of securities properly registered in the state where the 
seller maintains its principal office. None of the 16 states 
have chosen to do so. Our holding has the practical effect 
of reading S 60 into the regulations of each of those states 
despite the absence of such a restriction in the regulatory 
schemes of the 16 states. The majority concludes that this 
result is consistent with the Commerce Clause because it 
furthers two "particularly strong" local interests, viz., 
preserving the reputation of New Jersey broker-dealers and 
protecting New Jersey buyers in the secondary market. Maj. 
Opn. at 17-19. My colleagues can reach this conclusion by 
viewing S 60 as having only an "incidental" impact on 
interstate commerce. As I state above, S 60 imposes an 
absolute ban on interstate commerce that consists of 
soliciting individual buyers of Imatec stock from New 
Jersey. If we analyzed the regulation from the perspective of 
that absolute ban on the solicited sale of Imatec securities 
to residents of the states where the securities have been 
approved for sale, the burden on interstate commerce 
would be far more substantial than the majority suggests. 
 
However, even assuming arguendo that the regulations at 
issue here have only an "incidental" effect on interstate 
commerce, New Jersey's interest is still not sufficient to 
justify prohibiting solicitations in 16 states where these 
securities are registered. I believe that finding such an 
interest requires more than the asserted need to protect 
potential purchasers residing elsewhere from the risks of 
penny stocks and sellers such as Goldmen. It requires 
some showing that the interests New Jersey seeks to 
further would be advanced by applying S 60 to solicitations 
of Imatec. If the Bureau can establish that Goldmen is 
engaging in false and misleading sales practices or fraud, 
New Jersey has an interest sufficient to survive scrutiny 
under the Commerce Clause. But, the Bureau concedes 
that "[t]his is not a fraud case." App. at 558. Therefore, I 
am at a loss to understand how the majority can conclude 
on the record before us that New Jersey has shown a 
"particularly strong" interest. 
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Since New Jersey's interest absent fraudulent business 
activities is minimal at least, the federal interests are 
paramount. It is not a question of allowing one state's 
regulatory scheme to prevail over that of another state. "The 
balance here must be struck in favor of the federal 
interests." Kassell, 450 U.S. at 667. Accordingly, I believe 
we should affirm the decision of the district court. 
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